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In a competitive audit market, audit fees paid by firms to their auditors are used to 
measure auditor’s effort. Audit fees should reflect the predictable cost of audit hours 
and the perceived business risk. More focus is given to the client risk and the factors 
that determine the total audit fees, by using a large sample of publicly traded US firms 
for the period 2000-2019. Client size, auditee profitability, auditee risk, complexity of 
the client, auditor size and industry type are considered as the explanatory variables 
in our baseline audit fee model. Our results are in line with prior literature, supporting 
that the higher is the client risk, the more audit fees are paid. However this study 
examines not only the external view of the business risk, the market side, but also pays 
attention to the auditor’s and manager’s view. To be more precise, it is examined the 
influence of earnings volatility and the internal management inefficiencies on the level 
of total audit fees. Both variables have a positive relationship with our dependent 
variable (total audit fees) and their linkage is in compliance with prior studies. These 
findings are robust to a variety of additional tests and several alternative design 
specifications. 
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A number of previous studies have attempted to develop models that explain the 
variation in the level of audit fees paid by firms. Present research’s baseline model 
was conducted based on the studies by Simunic (1984), Francis (1984) and Wallace 
(1984) where the most significant determinants of total audit fees have examined. In 
more detail, client size, auditee profitability, auditee risk, complexity of the client, 
auditor size and industry type are used in our baseline audit fee model. More 
emphasis is given to the relationship of systematic risk, business risk and management 
inefficiencies with total audit fees. Although there are numerous studies around the 
topic of total audit fees and their linkage with audit quality, the above issue is a bit 
restricted. In fact the variables used in determining the audit fee model are not 
directly observable. The aim of this study is to provide a better understanding of the 
logic behind the audit fee pricing and especially for US publicly listed firms during the 
period 2000-2019. A longer period of time is preferred as it provides a more 
comprehensive insight and allows both researchers and readers to look at changes 
over time. The influence on total audit fees is explained at length from various views 
and more specifically from investors’, auditors’ and managers’ side. 
According to the systematic risk, its importance and positive impact on the level of 
total audit fees is confirmed by Rao and MacDonald (2011). To be more precise, the 
authors separate firms with relatively little and heavier regulation, with the first to be 
influenced by the systematic risk in contrast to the second firms. Huang, Chang and 
Chiou (2016) examined also the behavior of the market on audit fees in China. The 
findings revealed a significant positive relationship between the market concentration 
and total audit fees. The need for more audit work is minimized, the client risk is 
reduced and consequently less audit fees are paid by the firms. In order to prove this 
positive relationship of systematic risk with total audit fees in our research, the most 
representative tool is the company’s median annual beta which measures the 
volatility of a portfolio compared to the market as a whole. 
Additionally, Bryan, Mason and Reynolds (2018) in their study supported a positive 
association between earnings volatility and total audit fees. Auditors tend to charge 
higher audit fees or resign when the earnings volatility is increased. In fact auditors 
view high earnings volatility as an increasing risk as they should work more by making 
complex accounting estimates. Bell and Griffin (2012) emphasized on these challenges 
and the difficulty of acquiring reasonable assurance for fair value estimates with high 
levels of uncertainty. By measuring the three-year variance of past earnings, we can 
identify the impact of earnings volatility on audit fees. This risk proxy can help us to 
control the inherent risk more precisely and the amount of uncertainty in a security’s 
value. 
Last but not least, the managerial inefficiency will be examined in our baseline audit 
fee model and its influence on the level of total audit fees. Salehi, Shiri and Hossini 
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(2019) claimed that there is an inverse and significant relationship between 
managerial ability and audit fees in Iran. More specifically, managerial inefficiencies 
make firms to be charged with increased audit fees. Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012) 
in their study suggest ways to quantify managers’ efficiency in generating revenues. 
The paper helps us to conduct our study by offering precise measure of the managerial 
ability, as this variable is unobservable. A useful efficiency ratio for examining the 
association of internal management inefficiencies with total audit fees is the inventory 
turnover ratio. This statistical tool indicates the sales effectiveness and the way the 
company is managing its stock. 
The rest of this paper is divided into four sections. The following section reviews the 
theoretical and empirical literature, helping to proceed with the hypothesis 
development. Then the selected sample is presented and the methodology that will 
be used for the present research study. The empirical findings and results are 
discussed in detail in section four along with our sensitivity and robustness tests. 
Finally, the outcomes and the research limitations are concluded in the last section 




II. Prior Research & Hypotheses 
 
 
Client's Business Risk and Audit Fees 
 
The market’s external view is defined by the systematic risk which is an inherent 
business risk. This element measures the volatility of a portfolio and whether there 
are satisfied investors. Systematic risk is a strong component in the determination of 
total audit fees and as we can see previous studies can confirm this powerful linkage. 
A research conducted by Tribou (2019) tested the amount of audit fees paid by US 
government agencies. More specifically, this project analyzed both client risk 
components and audit climate factors in total audit fees. An outstanding outcome was 
the positive relationship between systematic risk and audit fees based on the audit 
fee models of the private sector. Apart from that, a positive linkage was identified in 
debt to assets ratio and audit complexity variables with audit fees. 
Leidner and Lenz (2017) examined for the period 2009 - 2011 a sample of 573 German 
credit institution year observations and they proved that business risk is associated 
with audit fees. This study provides evidence that a credit institution's business risk is 
associated not only with audit fees but also PIE (Public Interest Entities) credit 
institutions pay approximately 27.29% higher audit fees. Moreover there is an 
observable association between the interaction of a credit institution's business risk, 
PIE status and audit fees. 
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A study from Kim and Fukukawa (2013) investigated the association between the Big 
3 audit firms in Japan and the risk of the client. In more detail, their findings suggested 
that an increase in the audit effort increases the Big 3 Japanese firms’ responses to 
clients' business risk, respectively. However there were remarkable variations in the 
strength of the relationships between clients' business risk and audit fees in the firms. 
Two of the Big 3 firms (Azsa and ShinNihon) charged a higher risk premium than 
Tohmatsu, and ShinNihon increased its effort more than the other two firms. These 
differences in the Big 3 firms may be reflected in each firm's client characteristics and 
in auditor-related factors. Clients in the 3 Japanese firms differed in aspects like size, 
complexity and riskiness. Tohmatsu had smaller and not so risky clients, so it did not 
charge them with a risk premium and it increased only the audit effort. 
Additionally, Stanley (2011) confirmed that the audit fee disclosure was a major 
indicator of the clients' business risk operating performance. A large sample of U.S. 
companies for the period 2000 - 2007 was used as an audit fee model and the main 
hypothesis was referred to the connection between observed audit prices and future 
reported changes in clients' economic condition. According to this hypothesis, the 
study ended up that audit fees were significantly related to the one-year-ahead 
change in clients' operating performance. The author revealed that changes in clients’ 
earnings behavior were translated to audit fees, so it was identified a relationship 
between the two variables. 
Taking into consideration the aforementioned contradicting studies, we conclude on 
the first hypothesis where we claim that: 
H1: Higher audit fees translate to higher client (business) risk. 
 
 
Volatility of Earnings and Audit Fees 
 
Auditor and client relationship is considered as vital in the field of accounting for many 
years. Audit fees should measure auditor’s perceived business risk and the predictable 
cost of audit hours and try to determine whether audit firms bear the expected costs 
of business risk. Prior literature tries to identify the association between business risk 
and audit fees and whether it is empirically observable. 
Bryan, Mason and Reynolds (2018) investigated whether the audit fees and earnings 
volatility were related. The authors defined the existence of association between 
earnings autocorrelation, earnings volatility and audit fees. Autocorrelation and 
volatility of earnings were time series and characterized risk factors that influenced 
the auditor’s inherent risk. Auditors should make more substantive tests in order to 
minimize the overall audit risk. The research’s findings revealed that there was a 
positive relationship between audit fees and earnings volatility and a negative linkage 
for audit fees and autocorrelation of earnings respectively. According to the study’s 
sample, the audit fees changed at 4% by dividing the dataset into earnings 
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autocorrelation and volatility. In specific, this change was translated to 95,600 $ for 
the average firm-year observation. It was also claimed that the association between 
all the variables was weakened for industry specialist auditors and the earnings 
autocorrelation was decreased contrary to the non-specialists. 
Another research by Huang, Lin and Raghunandan (2016) tested the impact on the 
volatility of other comprehensive income (OCI) in a company’s profits. Based on hand-
collected data from 2002-2006, the study showed the reflection of OCI volatility in the 
market price movements and especially in equity price changes and exchange rate. 
Although the inherent risk was greater in firms with an increasing volatility of OCI, it 
was found a positive relationship between audit fees and OCI volatility. Moreover, the 
research revealed the impact of the OCI volatility on audit fees and the way that the 
firm’s future earnings were affected. The IASB (International Accounting Standards 
Board) required companies to present separately OCI components which influence 
firm’s future earnings. 
Meijer, Rohwedder and Wansbeek (2012) paid attention to the existence of 
measurement error in earnings data. Based on a Swedish data sample, it was used a 
combination of methods both for survey and register data. The findings supported 
that survey earnings data are more reliable than register earnings data. In the case of 
mismatch, the latter are more sensitive to the measurement error. However those 
who use a mixture model approach for survey and register data and take into account 
conditional probabilities have better results from all other predictors. 
Gottschalk and Huynh (2010) examined the influence of measurement error on 
measures of inequality and mobility that are based on self-reported earnings. The 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to tax records was used 
to recognize the association between the properties of measurement error and the 
properties of standard measures of inequality and mobility. It was revealed the 
presence of a substantial measurement error in SIPP earnings which was not in 
compliance with the classical. This research proved the positive relationship of 
measurement error not only with log earnings but also across time. The non-classical 
measurement error affects more the estimates of inequality contrary to those based 
on tax records. Consequently mobility has an insignificant influence in measurement 
error, a result of large biases in measures of earnings and lagged earnings. 
Taking into consideration the aforementioned contradicting studies, we form the 
following hypothesis: 






Audit Fees and Internal Management Inefficiencies 
 
Internal management inefficiencies are another factor with a catalytic role on the total 
audit fees. Based on previous studies we can identify the association between client 
risk and total audit fees and their significance, but this time from managers’ side. 
Chang, Kao, Mashruwala and Sorensen (2018) examined a sample of 165 audit 
engagements performed by a Big 4 international certified public accountant (CPA) 
firm. In their research they paid attention especially in the technical and allocative 
inefficiencies of the audit firm’s staff. It was known that the lower billing realization 
rates on audit engagements occurred due to technical inefficiencies of audit 
engagements. The authors came to the conclusion that both inefficiencies, technical 
and allocative on audit engagements lead to lower billing realization rates after 
controlling characteristics which affect realization rates. There were also identified 
differences between the two types of inefficiencies across audit engagements and for 
that reason it was crucial to understand the significance of efficiency in the auditing 
industry. 
Aissa and Goaied (2016) analyzed the role of hotel profitability by using a sample of 
27 hotel companies operating in Tunisia from 2000 to 2010. The Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and the Return on Assets (ROA) analysis test the managerial efficiency 
which is affected by geographical and operational factors. Hotel size, level of 
indebtedness and levels of managers' education have a catalytic role to the hotel’s 
profitability. Findings support that hotel’s general manager with high education level 
indicates higher levels of profitability. Hotel investors’ goal should be to increase 
profitability and management efficiency by taking into consideration several factors. 
Kontodimopoulos, Papathanasiou, Tountas and Niakas (2011) in their study examined 
124 dialysis facilities from the Greek dialysis sector in order to measure the managerial 
inefficiency which controls external features. Generally, the external operating 
environment’s characteristics influence the technical efficiency. It is given emphasis 
on the significance of efficiency comparisons and on exogenous conditions beyond the 
influence of management. This study used an input-oriented, variable-returns-to-
scale DEA model and new efficiency scores for measuring managerial inefficiency. The 
newer, private and Athens-based facilities were operating under favorable conditions 
contrary to the older, public and regional facilities. Consequently, these facilities give 
higher and lower efficiency scores which can be compared fairly measuring the 
management’s inefficiency. 
Another research conducted by Dopuch, Gupta, Simunic and Stein (2003) investigated 
the production efficiency and the pricing of audit services in a sample of 247 
geographically dispersed audits of U.S. firms. This study used stochastic frontier 
estimation (SFE) and data development analysis (DEA) in order to test the audit 
production’s efficiency. Apart from that, it was examined whether there were any 
production inefficiencies related to audit pricing. The study resulted in the weaknesses 
faced by the SFE model to detect inefficiencies contrary to the DEA’s model ability to 
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identify inefficiencies in production. The findings revealed that the average audit 
production was calculated at 88% efficiency level and DEA’s model efficiencies were 
associated with the company’s realization rate. It was suggested that the existence of 
moderate production inefficiencies of many accounting firm’s audits lead to higher 
audit fees for the company. 
This discussion leads us to formulate our last hypothesis where we claim that: 





III. Data & Methodology 
 
In order to test the relationship of audit fees with the client’s business risk, the 
volatility of earnings and the internal management inefficiencies, it is chosen a 
longitudinal sample of different countries of USA for the present research. The sample 
was obtained through the Compustat US and the Wharton Research Data Services and 
it has 117,941 observations, few of them are excluded due to the lack of some needed 
data or undeclared audit fees. Apart from the missing values, 19,204 observations will 
not be taken into consideration as they refer to not USA countries (the observations 
are especially from China, Great Britain, Germany etc.). The data sample is a large one 
as it contains 1,455 variables from which only 13 will be used for the present study. 
The auditor fee data used in this research are fee data referred to the period 2000 – 
2019. Therefore, creating a model that is able to understand the factors used to 
determine the audit fees is expected to be extremely beneficial. 
The purpose of this study is to quantify the levels of total audit fees by examining their 
relationship with the client’s risk in various American jurisdictions. More specifically, 
it will be examined the business risk from the side of investors which is the external 
view of the market. Beta is the ideal tool for determining the expected return from an 
investment. The investors pay close attention to a corporation's beta, a measure of 
the stock's sensitivity to risk. They expect to have the higher returns of their money 
which requires to take on more risk. Apart from investors, the audit fees affect 
internally the market by the part of auditors. Auditors usually examine all relevant 
transactions in the audit of retained earnings and dividends. Like many other financial 
statement line items, they need to test various audit assertions in the audit of retained 
earnings and dividends. These are completeness, existence and presentation and 
disclosure assertions. Last but not least, managerial efficiency has a vital role in the 
determination of audit fees. The manager should satisfy not only the employees’ 
needs but also the organization’s objectives. By using the inventory turnover ratio, he 
can measure the management efficiency and identify the existence of any inefficient 
management practices that are based on its inventory operations processes. 
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Baseline Audit Fee Model 
 
It is beneficial for the present study to start with the explanation of the logic behind 
the audit fee pricing and the different factors that affect the final audit fee level. 
Although there are several models that are designed to take into account the audit 
fees’ basic components, noticeable differences are observed between them. 
Consequently, there is not a generally accepted model for the definition and 
determination of audit fees. Simon and Francis (1988) developed an audit fee pricing 
model which tested the cross sectional regression of audit fees with a number of 
explanatory variables. The present research was based on this cross-sectional audit 
fee regression model in order to test the relationship of audit fees with client’s risk, 
volatility of earnings and management inefficiencies. This baseline model will be used 
to test all the hypotheses of the present study, by adding in each one the explanatory 
variable that suitably represents it and explains better its association with audit fees. 
The most typical factors that are measurable and affect the audit fee level model are 
involved and described comprehensively. The methodology employed in this study is 
quantitative analysis and the model built tries to measure and determine the total 
audit fee level with multiple regression analysis. The baseline audit fee model is 
presented below, where the subscript i represents each company and t represents 
each year: 
 
log_aud_feesit = a + b1 * log_atit + b2 * log_revtit + b3 * roait + b4 * debt_ratit + b5 * 
invreit + b6 * BIG4it + b7 * gsecit + eit 
 
Description: 
a = intercept value 
log_atit = Natural logarithm of Total Assets, in time t 
log_revtit = Natural logarithm of Total Revenue, in time t 
roait = Return on Assets, in time t 
debt_ratit = Debt Ratio, in time t 
invreit = Sum of Inventory and Accounts Receivables divided to Total Assets, in time t 
BIG4it = Dummy variable, 1: if the auditor belongs to the Big 4, 0: if the auditor is a 
non-Big 4 firm, in time t 
gsecit = GIC Sectors, in time t 
eit = Residual error term, in time t 
 
 
The dependent variable in this study is the level of total audit fees and are measured 
by the natural logarithm in time t. The dependent variable is used to improve the 
linear fit of the data and is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Bell, Landsman and 
Shackelford (2001), Ettredge, Scholz and Li (2007), Ittonen and Peni (2012)). Audit fees 
are the sum of the money paid to the auditor for an audit process that had been 
performed. To develop the baseline model of audit fees, we based on prior literature 
to identify the components that are most known to associate with audit fees in the 
 14 
audit market. The main factors affecting audit fee levels regarding to our hypotheses 
are coming from various views and especially from the side of the client and also from 
auditor’s and manager’s side. Joshi and AL-Bastaki (2000) confirmed that audit fees 
are significantly associated with the client size, the riskiness of the client, profitability 
and complexity of the client operations. In turn, Al-Harshani (2008) indicate that client 
size, liquidity ratio and profitability ratio were significant factors for the audit fees’ 
determination. As a result, the study strongly confirms that most of the previous 
research findings are applicable in our baseline audit fee model and audit fees have a 
significant relationship with all the components mentioned above. These factors affect 
the amount of needed audit work which consequently heightens the audit fee, if it is 
increased. 
The first explanatory variable is the amount of total assets which is a client size factor. 
Francis (1984) supported that the logarithmic audit fee model that associates logged 
audit fees with logged assets has become the accepted standard in the accounting 
literature. Additionally, Musah (2017), Kikhia (2015) and Collier and Gregory (1996), 
provide consistent evidence that the size of the client, especially total assets, is the 
most important variable in determining audit fees. The amount of total assets in 
balance sheet gives direction regarding to the company’s size. In more detail, the 
smaller is the client, the smaller is the number of total assets. Consequently, there is 
a strong correlation between audit fees and size of auditee. Both assets and revenues 
are used in our research to measure size which can be used together for capturing 
different dimensions of audit work. 
Auditee profitability is one of the important component in determining audit fees and 
is considered as a significant sign of management performance and its effectiveness 
in allocating available resources. When the company uses its assets and other 
resources efficiently, it has a high return on assets and the firm is characterized by 
profitability in its operations. Joshi and Al-Bastaki (2000) supported that highly 
profitable firms pay more audit fees to the external auditors. This happens as more 
audit time is needed for the conduction of accurate audit testing for the identification 
of revenue and expenses. Empirical studies carried out by Simunic (1984), Wallace 
(1984) and Joshi and AL-Bastaki (2000) proved the strong association between audit 
fees and profitability. Return on assets (ROA) is used as the indicator of profitability in 
this research. 
Moreover auditee risk should be considered in the baseline audit fee model, as it 
affects significantly auditor’s responsibility and audit work. Consequently, the higher 
client risk results in increased audit fees paid to the external auditors for their great 
responsibility. According to the research of Kim and Fukukawa (2013), the client risk 
varies regarding to the nature of company’s business. The authors concluded that two 
of the Big 3 firms in Japan charge a risk premium and increase audit effort with higher 
business risk. However, the relationship between audit fees and client’s risk differs to 
the third firm which does not charge a risk premium for audits. Firth (2002) supported 
that the higher level of client risk leads to higher audit fees and to greater audit effort. 
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To minimize future risks the company should undertake more detailed work. It is 
concluded that audit fees are associated positively with client’s risk. Thus, we 
proceeded and integrated into our model the debt ratio (debt_rat) as a risk indicator, 
which measures the extent of a company’s leverage and is calculated by the division 
of long term debt with total assets. 
Additionally, we employ another control variable to evaluate the total amount of audit 
fees, which is the sum of inventory and accounts receivables divided to total assets 
(invre). This ratio variable is used as a measure of the complexity of the auditee and is 
translated to an inherent risk. Thinggaard and Kiertzner (2008), El-Gammal (2012), 
Kikhia (2015) and Musah (2017) in their studies confirmed the importance of the 
control variable, auditee complexity to the determination of total audit fees. The 
greater the complexity of the auditee, the higher are the audit fees, the more time is 
needed and the auditors should perform more auditing procedures. It is fact that 
inventories and account receivables are a difficult way for auditing in comparison to 
other accounts such as cash assets. For that reason, there are numerous prior studies 
which use different indicators of complexity and mainly the number of subsidiaries 
and foreign operations, the number and location of operating units and the number 
of separate audit reports issued annually for the company. 
In order to measure the size of the auditor in our baseline model, we have used the 
variable BIG4 which returns the value of 1 if the company is audited by a BIG 4 auditor 
and otherwise it returns the value of 0. More specifically, it is examined whether the 
auditor is Deloitte Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP or 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PWC). Choi, Kim, Liu and Simunic (2008), Vermeer, 
Raghunandan and Forgione (2009), Kabir, Sharma, Islam and Salat (2011) in their 
studies supported the impact of the size of audit firms on audit fees and confirmed a 
positive relationship between them. Audit fees paid to the Big 4 audit firms are 
significantly higher than fees paid to the non-Big 4 firms. The fact that the biggest audit 
firms have a greater monopolistic power in the market and provide a higher quality of 
their services contrary to the non-BIG 4 firms, explain the positive relationship 
between auditor’s size and audit fees. In more detail, Bigus and Zimmermann (2008) 
pointed out that Big 4 obtained 87% of the total audit fees in Germany and PWC was 
characterized as the “market leader” related to the audit fees. 
Finally, the control variable gsec indicates the type of sector into which the audited 
client is framed. The type of sector is a significant component which determines the 
total audit fees and its significance is confirmed by prior literature. Ettredge, Xu and 
Yi (2014) in their study revealed that the banking industry needs more audit work due 
to its complex and difficult nature. This industry requires different accounting policies 
based on revenue and total assets and the auditors should have specialized knowledge 
for the banking industry. Our dataset indicates that the predominant sectors in USA 
are Financials (18.75%), Information Technology (16.97%), Health Care (15.61%), 
Industrials (12.53%) and Consumer Discretionary (12.40%) based on the Global 




Client’s risk is considered as a major element in determining the audit fees. Risk can 
be defined as the opportunity of a loss, so auditors should be cautious when 
expressing their opinion to avoid future litigations. The systematic risk is an inherent 
business risk which determines the external view of the market. The company's "beta" 
indicates the sensitivity of the stock price to systematic risk. This type of risk measures 
the return on a market portfolio, consisting of stocks and other securities in capital 
markets. The level of a company's systematic risk is influenced by factors such as the 
general level of risk related to any business enterprises and changing economic and 
market conditions. The companies usually have little control over the systematic risk, 
other than their ability to react to fluctuating conditions. Beta has a major role in the 
"Capital Asset Pricing Model" (CAPM) and it determines the expected return from an 
investment. This indicator that measures the stock's sensitivity to risk and the risk of 
a firm relative to a market index, is also responsible for the company’s value. 
Systematic risk or beta measures the volatility of a portfolio compared to the market 
as a whole. In more detail, beta controls the company’s earnings by selling stock and 
whether there are satisfied investors from this transaction. The higher the beta, the 
more vulnerable is the market to systematic risk. The industry sectors where the 
business operates in, the company’s financial gearing and operating leverage are 
reflected in the company’s beta. Taking into consideration the company’s median 
annual beta, it is revealed the positive linkage of the explanatory variable (business 
risk) with the model’s dependent variable. 
To test hypothesis H1 and demonstrate the relationship between client’s (business) 
risk and audit fees, we compute the following model. 
The regression model used is as follows:  
(1) log_aud_feesit = a + b1 * med_betait + b2 * log_atit + b3 * log_revtit + b4 * roait + b5 
* debt_ratit + b6 * invreit + b7 * BIG4it + b8 * gsecit + eit 
 
Description: 
med_betait = Median Annual Beta, in time t 
 
 
From auditor perspective, ensuring the quality of internal control and testing the 
controls is considered to be a challenging issue. To be more precise, volatility of 
earnings is another significant component for measuring total audit fees and auditor’s 
work since it is not directly visible. Bryan, Mason and Reynolds (2018) claimed that 
earnings volatility influences auditor’s understanding of inherent risk. The greater is 
the risk, the more audit work is needed and the firm should pay higher audit fees. 
Bryan and Mason (2020) continued their previous research by examining whether 
earnings volatility influences audit report lag. They revealed that earnings volatility 
has a negative linkage with audit report lag. The less volatile earnings are translated 
with more audit work and higher audit fees, like the prior study’s findings. Additionally 
 17 
Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy and Raghunandan (2003) found a positive 
relationship of earnings volatility both with audit and non-audit fees. Variance of past 
earnings is mainly affected by the net income or loss, dividends and prior-period 
adjustments. There are audit assertions in the audit of retained earnings and dividends 
which need to be tested. The test of completeness assertion verifies if all the retained 
earnings related transactions occurred during the year, are properly recorded in the 
client’s accounts. Moreover, the existence assertion examines whether there are 
dividends that are recorded or paid without the declaration from the client’s board of 
directors. According to the dividends recorded in the financial statements, they are a 
result of the retained earnings’ deduction and have been properly approved and 
declared. Presentation and disclosure are an audit assertion that we should have 
concerns on when we perform the audit of retained earnings and dividends. More 
specifically, there should be some restrictions on retained earnings regarding to the 
client’s banks, bondholders or other creditors. Consequently, the client faces 
difficulties in making payments of dividends to its shareholders. The client should 
properly disclose any restrictions on retained earnings that may exist from its 
agreements with the shareholders, in the notes to financial statements. 
In order to measure the volatility of past earnings the three-year variance of ROA is 
used and it indicates a risk proxy for our baseline model. This representative tool can 
measure the amount of risk and uncertainty in a security’s value, as the price of the 
security is not stable and it can fluctuate significantly over a time period. By including 
the variance of ROA in the multivariate model, we control more precisely the inherent 
risk and the impact of earnings volatility on audit fees is evaluated with more accuracy. 
 
To test hypothesis H2, we conduct an analysis to evaluate the earnings volatility on 
total audit fees. 
The model is specified as follows: 
 
(2) log_aud_feesit = a + b1 * varroa_it + b2 * log_atit + b3 * log_revtit + b4 * roait + b5 * 
debt_ratit + b6 * invreit + b7 * BIG4it + b8 * gsecit + eit 
 
Description: 
varroa_it = Three-Year Variance of Return on Assets (ROA), in time t 
 
 
Last but not least, managerial inefficiency is another determinant factor for the 
definition of total audit fees. Aissa and Goaied (2016) confirmed the importance of 
management efficiency in hotel profitability. In more detail, failures and managers’ 
inefficiencies lead to uncertainty, risk and the company has losses. The findings 
revealed that the less efficient is the manager, the higher are the audit fees and the 
levels of profitability are low. They also supported that the industry’s profitability and 
efficiency is dependent on the manager’s education level. It is fact that managerial 
efficiency is an important tool which helps the manager to maximize his effectiveness 
and the firm to reach at the higher profitability. Managerial efficiency is a combination 
of management, leadership and teaming skills in productivity and its presence can 
 18 
both minimize the total amount of audit fees and improve the organization’s 
productivity. Manager’s goal should be to satisfy both the employees’ needs and the 
organizational objectives. In the case that the organization meets its goal, it can be 
used inventory ratio tools to measure the management efficiency. These ratio analysis 
tools help management to identify inefficient management practices based on its 
inventory operations processes. More specifically the inventory turnover ratio is a 
suitable ratio used to determine the effectiveness of the company’s inventory 
management. It measures the frequency by which the inventory is purchased and sold 
during the entire fiscal year. Higher inventory turnover ratios are more preferential 
for the firms as they indicate good sales or buys. On the other hand, a low inventory 
turnover ratio is not a healthy sign for the firm which is translated to a surplus in 
inventory. In this case the business needs less investment in inventory in order to be 
managerially efficient and pay less audit fees. Its priority should be to improve the 
inventory turnover ratio by giving emphasis on its sales or decreasing the funds on a 
stock. 
To test the H3 hypothesis of our baseline model we should calculate the inventory 
turnover ratio. Its formula is estimated by the division of Cost of Goods Sold (cogs) 
with the total amount of Inventories (invt). Cost of Goods Sold measures the 
company’s production costs of goods and services and it includes mainly the cost of 
materials, labor costs and any overhead costs. The inventory turnover ratio depicts 
the company’s ability to sync its sales and purchasing departments. It is a useful 
statistical tool as it indicates whether there is sales effectiveness and how well the 
company is managing its stock. 
Inventory Turnover Ratio (intur) = Cost of Goods Sold (cogs) / Total Inventory (invt) 
 
The model used to test the H3 hypothesis between managerial inefficiency and audit 
fees is the following: 
 
(3) log_aud_feesit = a + b1 * linturit + b2 * log_atit + b3 * log_revtit + b4 * roait + b5 * 
debt_ratit + b6 * invreit + b7 * BIG4it + b8 * gsecit + eit 
 
Description: 











Descriptive statistics for all the variables in our cross-sectional model are presented in 
Table 1 below. According to the sample’s size, it is comprised by 98,737 observations 
and all the companies of our sample are listed on S&P 500 Index, NASDAQ, Dow Jones 
and Russell 2000 Index. As we can see, the amount of observations for every variable 
is not 98,737 (apart from audit fees) which is an indication of missing values in our 
sample. The dependent variable is the AUDIT_FEES and its mean is $1,484,449, 
suggesting a high value which is an interpretation of extreme outliers in our sample. 
In order to avoid their existence, all the variables are trimmed. More specifically, the 
outliers of the variables are minimized with the winsor command and by using the 
natural logarithm of our variables we have a more reliable dataset. The new 
dependent variable aud_fees_tr is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels respectively 
and its mean is $12.959 million. Additionally, we take the natural logarithm of the total 
assets, revenue and inventory turnover ratio due to their excessive amounts. We have 
winsorized these variables in order to avoid the effect of extreme outliers. Both client 
size variables have almost the same values in their mean and median which indicates 
the absence of outliers. Return on assets (ROA), the indicator of profitability is 
observed to have a negative value of -0.101. The mean value of debt ratio 0.190 means 
that the greater portion of the company's assets is funded by equity. The dummy 
variable Big 4, an auditor size’s variable is presented in the following table and it takes 
the value of 1 whether the firm is audited by a Big 4 and otherwise it returns the value 
of 0. Its mean indicates that the majority of the auditors belong to Big 4 and especially 
they include the 69.50%. Although our sample is comprised only by listed companies, 
there are enough of them which are audited by non-Big 4 auditors something that 
should not happen. Beta’s mean is below 1 which is explained by a less risky and 
volatile security contrary to the market. Beta’s mean is also in compliance with its 
median. Regarding the risk proxy, variance of ROA which controls the impact of 
earnings volatility on audit fees it has a mean of 0.206. Finally, the inventory turnover 
ratio in the descriptive statistics has almost the same values in the mean and the 









Table 1: Descriptive statistics of all variables in the cross-sectional model. 
 
Statistics Mean Min Median Max Standard 
Deviation 
Observations 
Total Audit Fees 
(AUDIT_FEES) 
1,484,449 0 450,000 2.02e+08 4,010,846 98,737 
Total Audit Fees 
(aud_fees_tr) 
12.959 9.409 13.026 16.642 1.604 98,276 
Total Assets 
(log_at_tr) 
6.104 0.185 6.208 11.638 2.328 88,792 
Total Revenue 
(log_revt_tr) 
5.431 -1.410 5.506 10.746 2.389 85,945 
Return on Assets 
(roa_tr) 
-0.101 -2.918 0.013 0.368 0.435 86,129 
Debt Ratio 
(debt_rat_tr) 






0.086 -0.153 0.029 0.644 0.141 74,691 
Dummy BIG4 
(BIG4_tr) 




0.839 -0.162 0.811 2.445 0.585 86,899 
Variance of ROA 
(varroa_tr) 




1.912 -1.783 1.704 5.981 1.418 58,522 
 
Descriptive statistics include variable name, mean, minimum, median and maximum values, 











Correlation among Independent Variables 
 
In Table 2 a correlation matrix is provided, by measuring the association between 
variables and their strength of relationship. The correlation matrix summarizes the 
data and allows us to see which variable pairs have the highest correlation. Correlation 
coefficients, and especially the Pearson correlation can provide an indication for the 
existence of linearity between two variables. The diagonal cells with the value of 1 
shows that each variable always perfectly correlates with itself. The total assets and 
revenue are highly positively correlated with the natural logarithm of audit fees. 
Therefore this linkage is a sign that the client size variables can significantly influence 
the audit fees, as prior studies have proved (Musah (2017), Kikhia (2015) etc.). In the 
case that the correlation is above 0.8, there is the possibility for multicollinearity 
problem (Grewal, Cote and Baumgartner (2004)). It can be noticed in the following 
table that the majority of correlations do not rise to a severe multicollinearity problem 
(apart from the large correlation of log_aud_fees with log_at, log_aud_fees with 
log_revt and log_at with log_revt). In order to avoid any multicollinearity problems, 
we test them below in Table 3 with the variance inflation factor (VIF) in the Stata 
database. We also note that there is a moderate positive correlation among the 
logarithm of audit fees with dummy Big 4, median beta and debt ratio variables. The 
dependent variable of the present study is correlated to a low degree with the 
explanatory variables return on assets and inventory turnover ratio. The control 
variables inventory and accounts receivable to total assets and variance of return on 
assets have not only a low correlation with audit fees but also a negative one.
 22 





The results of the panel data regressions are presented in the Table 3 below and as it 
can be seen they are quantitatively similar to each other. Firstly, the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression model was used to examine the effect of every variable in 
the baseline audit fee model. The panel data regression models were estimated five 
times for the baseline model, for each hypothesis separately and then for the whole 
model. In the present research the values of R-squared are deviating from 70.20% to 
76.80%, which means that the model explains on average 73.50% of the variance in 
the total level of audit fees. Similarly, the adjusted R-squared moves around 70.20% 
to 76.80%.  
Then we proceed by estimating five models in which each one of them is examined 
with the explanatory variables. Firstly, the baseline audit fee model is regressed and 
it is shown that all the control variables influence significantly the total audit fees, 
apart from the debt ratio variable. The majority of the variables have a t-value greater 
than 1.96 (at 0.05 confidence) which indicates the importance of them in the model. 
The explanatory variable, debt ratio has a p-value of 0.348 and its t-value is lower than 
1.96, so it cannot be considered as a significant one.  
In the second regression in column (1) Total Audit Fees (aud_fees_tr) of Table 3, we 
test the hypothesis H1, we regress all the control variables and include the variable 
median annual beta (med_beta_tr). It should be referred that almost all the variables 
have a strong and positive effect at the 1% level of significance, as their p-values are 
equal to 0.000. Debt ratio variable also explains significantly the total audit fees but at 
the 10% significance level. Consequently, the variables influence strongly the level of 
our dependent variable and the model is significant since the overall R-squared is 
figured at 70.20 percent. 
Moving forward, the H2 hypothesis is tested by regressing the variables of the baseline 
model and adding the variance of Return on Assets (varroa_tr). It is observed that the 
debt ratio is not an important variable in the model. This can be explained with the 
very low t-value of -0.020 and the great p-value of 0.982, which end up that the debt 
ratio is not statistically significant in explaining the total audit fees. However, the 
model has high values in the overall R-squared and the adjusted R-squared equal to 
0.768. It should be discussed that the relationship between variance of past earnings 
and total audit fees is positive and is in compliance with our prior studies (Bryan, 
Mason and Reynolds (2018), Huang, Lin and Raghunandan (2016)). 
Last but not least, in the fourth column (3) Total Audit Fees (aud_fees_tr), all the 
explanatory variables are used and instead of variance of past earnings, the main 
variable considered is the inventory turnover ratio (lintur_tr). What should be 
mentioned here is that the variable lintur_tr has a strong statistical significant impact 
on audit fees, as its p-value (0.000) is smaller than all significance levels (1%, 5% and 
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10%). The rest variables are also significant and the model has high R-squared and 
adjusted R-squared values of 72.90%. 
In the last column, the regression for the whole model is examined. In order to build 
our full model, we keep all the independent variables in order to identify if altogether 
can survive or differently whether they are statistically significant for our model. This 
model is significant with F-statistic value of (12,732.89) and p=0.000, suggesting its 
statistical validation. As it can be showed, the model is interpreted significantly by all 
the variables. In more detail, their p-values of 0.000 can explain significant the level of 
total audit fees. The R-squared for this model is (0.768) which means that 76.80% of 
the variance in audit fees is explained by the model. The adjusted R-squared has the 
same value (0.768) with R-squared, which means that 76.80% of the variance could be 
explained by the model if it had been a sample of the whole population. The whole 
year's model is presented below: 
aud_fees_tr = 10.243 + 0.129*log_at_tr + 0.392*log_revt_tr – 0.656*roa_tr + 
0.164*debt_rat_tr – 0.821*invre_tr + 0.356*BIG4_tr + 0.181*med_beta + 
0.262*varroa_tr – 0.094*lintur_tr 
Additionally, it has conducted the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each regression 
respectively. According to Grewal, Cote and Baumgartner (2004), this check will detect 
whether there is apparent the multicollinearity problem. The values of the VIF greater 
than 10 will show the presence of multicollinearity in the audit fee model. As it is 
observed, the results of mean VIF in all our columns range from 2.200 to 3.120 and 
are below from 5.00, so the problem of multicollinearity is eliminated. The higher is 
the VIF the more correlated are the variables, but in the case it has a very high value 
























Table 3: Panel Data Regressions with Total Audit Fees (aud_fees_tr). 
 
Panel data results include the coefficient, the p-value and t-student respectively for each variable. 
***indicates significance at 1% level, *indicates significance at 10% level 
 Baseline 
Model 
(1) Total Audit 
Fees 
(aud_fees_tr) 
(2)  Total Audit 
Fees 
(aud_fees_tr) 
























































































































































F-Statistic 29,023.63 21,259.30 23,652.14 19,808.11 12,732.89 
R-squared 0.708 0.702 0.768 0.729 0.768 
Adjusted R2 0.708 0.702 0.768 0.729 0.768 
N 71,868 63,216 49,973 51,389 34,477 
Mean VIF 2.460 2.200 2.580 3.120 2.800 
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Robustness & Sensitivity Tests 
 
A variety of additional tests is examined in this section to identify whether our 
empirical findings are robust. Firstly, we will use a different ratio in order to examine 
and measure the systematic risk regarding to the H1 hypothesis. Apart from company’s 
beta, the median annual total volatility is a useful tool for testing the association 
between client’s risk and total audit fees. This statistical measure indicates that the 
higher values it takes, the riskier is the security and consequently higher are the audit 
fees. A higher volatility means that a security's value has more disperse returns and 
the asset's prices do not swing around the mean price. In more detail, it is observed 
that the results of this ratio differ from those of the median annual beta. What should 
be marked in this case is the negative coefficient between the above variable with 
total audit fees. This negative relationship differs from median beta’s impact on audit 
fees. Based on the high R-squared value of 69.00%, the model is presented as 
significant but less significant than the model in column (1) Total Audit Fees 
(aud_fees_tr) of Table 3. 
Then, we test the sensitivity of the results to industry differences. More specifically, 
we exclude the financial industry from our audit fee model, which is equivalent to 
18.75% and is considered as the largest industry in USA. So, now our total sample is 
equal to 81.25% and includes the Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Information Technology, 
Communication Services, Utilities and Real Estate industries. It should be mentioned 
that our model explains 78.30% of the variance in the total level of audit fees and is 
explained better contrary to our previous model in the third column of Table 3. All the 
variables are statistically significant and it is concluded that the present regression 
with the industry limitation has a stronger influence on the level of total audit fees. 
On our last robustness test, we decide to test the H3 hypothesis between managerial 
efficiency and audit fees but with a different efficiency ratio this time. The revenue 
per employee ratio (rev_emp_tr) is used instead of the inventory turnover ratio. The 
association between our new variable and total audit fees is significant at the 1% 
significance level, as the p-value is 0.00. Comparing this regression with the previous 
in column (3) Total Audit Fees (aud_fees_tr) of Table 3, we reached to the conclusion 
that this one is robust while comparing inventory turnover ratio with our alternative 
efficiency ratio. In more detail, 71.20% of the variance on audit fees is explained by 
















































































































  -0.039 
0.000*** 
(-13.060) 
F-Statistic 20,116.15 23,160 24,261.11 
R-squared 0.690 0.783 0.712 
Adjusted R2 0.690 0.783 0.712 
N 63,216 44,890 68,726 




Τhe main objective of this study has been to examine the impact of business risk on 
the level of total audit fees and their determinant factors. We provide an overview of 
total audit fees for US firms during the period 2000 -2019 and audit fees’ association 
with client size, auditee profitability, auditee risk, complexity of the client, auditor size 
and industry type. Moving forward, our present study develops three hypotheses 
which are referred to: (a) Client's Business Risk and Audit Fees, (b) Volatility of 
Earnings and (c) Internal Management Inefficiencies. To be more precise, the 
influence of business risk on audit fees is examined from the side of investors, auditors 
and managers, which depicts that our research provides an overall picture of the 
economy. According to the first hypothesis, we conclude that the higher is the client 
risk, the more audit fees are paid. Company’s beta is the ideal tool to measure the 
sensitivity of the stock price to systematic risk. By using the tree-year variance of ROA 
in the next hypothesis, we can measure the inherent risk from the internal view of the 
market. The results revealed that the amount of audit fees is positively related to the 
variance of past earnings. We further identify that the more efficient is the manager, 
the lower are the audit fees and the levels of profitability are high. The above finding 
is in compliance with the study conducted by Aissa and Goaied (2016) and emphasizes 
in the importance of managerial efficiency for audit fees’ definition. 
By taking into consideration the limitations of the present study, it should be referred 
that data used may contain errors, incorrect information or outliers. Although they 
have trimmed at 1% and 99% respectively and have taken natural logarithms for 
variables with high values, there is still the possibility for not perfect data and 
unobservable risks. Additionally, the dataset contains only US firms and SEC 
Registrants that are publicly listed on S&P 500 Index, NASDAQ, Dow Jones and Russell 
2000 Index. This boundary can lead to a future research that will compare the present 
study’s findings with those of European countries. This kind of studies will be useful to 
recognize differences and similarities on the influence of business risk in the level of 
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Winsorized value of the natural logarithm of Total Audit 
Fees in time t 
Independent and Control Variables 
log_at_tr 
Winsorized value of the  natural logarithm of  Total Assets 
in time t 
log_revt_tr 
Winsorized value of the  natural logarithm of  Total 
Revenue in time t 
roa_tr 
Winsorized value of the natural logarithm of  Return on 
Assets in time t 
debt_rat_tr 
Winsorized value of the  natural logarithm of  Debt Ratio 
in time t 
invre_tr 
Winsorized value of the Sum of Inventory and Accounts 
Receivables divided to Total Assets in time t 
BIG4_tr 
Winsorized Dummy variable with value of 1, if the firm is 
audited by a Big 4, otherwise zero in time t 
gsec GIC Sectors in time t 
med_beta Winsorized value of the Median Annual Beta in time t 
med_tvol_tr 
Winsorized value of the Median Annual Total Volatility in 
time t 
varroa_tr 
Winsorized value of the  Three-Year Variance of Return on 
Assets in time t 
lintur_tr Winsorized value of the Inventory Turnover Ratio in time t 
rev_emp_tr 
Winsorized value of the Revenue per Employee Ratio in 
time t 
